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Abstract
The recent October 2016 DDoS attack on Dyn served
as a wakeup call to the security community as many
popular and independent webservices (e.g., Twitter, Spo-
tify) were impacted. This incident raises a larger ques-
tion on the fragility of modern webservices due to their
dependence on third-party services. In this paper, we
characterize the dependencies of popular webservices
on third party services and how these can lead to DoS,
RoQ attacks and reduction in security posture. In par-
ticular, we focus on three critical infrastructure services:
DNS, CDNs, and certificate authorities (CAs). We an-
alyze both direct relationships (e.g., Twitter uses Dyn)
and indirect dependencies (e.g.,Netflix uses Symantec as
OCSP and Symantec in turn uses Verisign for DNS).
Our key findings are: (1) 73.14% of the top 100,000
popular services are vulnerable to reduction in availabil-
ity due to potential attacks on third-party DNS, CDN,
CA services that they exclusively rely on; (2) the use
of third-party services is concentrated, so that if the
top-10 providers of CDN, DNS and OCSP services go
down, they can potentially impact 25%-46% of the top
100K most popular web services; (3) transitive depen-
dencies significantly increase the set of webservices that
exclusively depend on popular CDN and DNS service
providers, in some cases by ten times (4) targeting even
less popular webservices can potentially cause signifi-
cant collateral damage, affecting upto 20% of the top-
100K webservices due to their shared dependencies.
Based on our findings, we present a number of key im-
plications and guidelines to guard against such Internet-
scale incidents in the future.
1 Introduction
In October 2016, a major managed DNS provider, Dyn,
fell victim to a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) at-
tack [4]. Dyn hosted the authoritative nameservers for
many popular web services, such as PayPal, Twitter, and
Github and as a result they were inaccessible to a siz-
able part of the East Coast. It turned out that many other
webservices were also dependent on Dyn, therefore the
incident resulted in a massive impact on the availability
of many popular webservices.
This recent incident suggests that the modern webser-
vices ecosystem is perhaps much more fragile than one
would expect, and that threat actors are already taking
advantage of this. At the same time, this incident also
raises many broader questions about the robustness (and
fragility) of the web ecosystem:
• How robust or fragile are popular webservices in
terms of their dependency on third-party infrastruc-
ture services? E.g., do they use any form of redun-
dancy when using third-party services?
• Is the Dyn incident a singular type of occurrence or
there are other types of hidden third-party services
that are also potential Achilles’ heel for affecting pop-
ular webservices?
• Are there more subtle or transitive dependencies be-
tween webservices and their third-party providers;
e.g., loading webservice Netflix entails third-party
service Symantec which in turn depends on Verisign
for DNS
In this paper, we systematically address these ques-
tions using a measurement-driven approach by analyz-
ing the top 100,000 sites (as defined by the Alexa rank-
ings) [2]. We believe that such a study is timely and
significant to understand the security of modern web-
services. While there are some key limitations of the
types of end-to-end vantage point measurement studies
(e.g., we do not have capacity estimates for third-party
services, we cannot infer third-party dependencies that
are not visible to end hosts, we don’t consider inter-
webservice dependencies), we believe that our findings
are nevertheless valuable and relevant. The answers to
the aforementioned questions have key implications both
for different stakeholders as we shed light on key bot-
tlenecks that are potential vectors for future large-scale
attacks.
Specifically, we focus on three key types of third-party
services that most modern webservices rely on and that
are critical pieces in the lifetime of a web request: nam-
ing (DNS), SSL certificate validation (OCSP), and con-
tent delivery (CDN). We analyze two kinds of poten-
tial dependencies: (1) direct dependencies of the simple
kind found in the Dyn incident where a webservice like
Spotify uses Dyn as its DNS provider and (2) indirect
or transitive dependencies that consider “multi-hop” ef-
ar
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fects; e.g., loading Netflix.com entails loading Symantec
which in turn depends on Verisign for DNS.
Our key findings are:
• 73.14% of the top 100,000 popular services are vul-
nerable to reduction in availability due to potential at-
tacks on third-party DNS, CDN, CA services that they
exclusively rely on;
• The use of third-party services is concentrated, so that
if the top-10 providers of CDN, DNS and OCSP ser-
vices go down, they can potentially impact 25%-46%
of the most popular web services;
• Transitive dependencies significantly increase the set
of webservices that exclusively depend on popular
CDN and DNS service providers, in some cases by
ten times, and even affect the set of most popular
providers;
• Transitive dependencies can introduce even simpler
attack capabilities to achieve similar goals. For ex-
ample, targeting less popular webservices can poten-
tially cause significant collateral damage, affecting
upto 20% of the top-100K webservices due to their
shared dependencies.
Based on these findings, we derive key implications
for future services and attacks. Specifically, we recom-
mend that: (1) webservices seek to increase their robust-
ness by adding more redundancy w.r.t third party ser-
vices and also be aware of the hidden dependencies of
the third-party services they employ and (2) Third-party
services increase the transparency in reporting potential
attack events and also provide a quantitative understand-
ing of their infrastructure and dependencies to the web
services. Finally, we also observe that these have im-
plications for attackers as they can uncover new attack
targets for indirectly affecting webservices that can max-
imize the impact for a fixed amount of attack resources.
2 Background and Motivation
In this section we begin with real-world case studies that
highlight three potential threats that webservices (WSes)
may face as a result of the dependencies with other third-
party services (TPSes). We specifically focus on three
types of potential threats in this paper as discussed below.
Denial of Service (DoS) Denial of Service (DoS) oc-
curs when users of a particular service are unable to ac-
cess it, for reasons such as an attack on it or an internal
failure. In 2016, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack on a Managed DNS provider called Dyn caused
the unavailability of many websites such as Twitter, Spo-
tify, Github etc.[4] Dyn is the authoritative name server
of these and many other websites. Authoritative name
servers are responsible for name resolutions to a particu-
lar zone where a DNS zone is a contiguous namespace
for which administrative responsibility has been dele-
gated to a single authority. For example, if a user goes to
twitter.com then the authoritative name server for twitter
will be responsible for answering queries to twitter.com
which in this scenario was Dyn. If the authoritative name
server becomes inaccessible as a result of an attack or
a bug, it can lead to failed name resolutions for all the
domains that rely on it, which makes the clients unable
to access those domains. This is what happened in this
case where a dependency of multiple WSes on a single
provider led to denial of service for all of their users.
Another such incident happened with Cloudflare, a
major DNS and CDN provider, when a software bug
caused DNS and HTTP requests of some of its customer
websites to fail [21]. Similarly, in 2013, Cloudflare effec-
tively disappeared from the Internet due to a router mis-
configuration. These incidents show that the dependency
of websites on various services become single points of
failure in the face of an attack or misconfiguration [30].
Reduction of Security (RoS) Reduction of Security
happens when the security of a WS is compromised, as
a result of an attack or misconfiguration. To give an ex-
ample of such an attack, consider the public-private key
cryptography primitives used along with Certificate Au-
thorities (CA’s) used to provide end-to-end confidential-
ity (encryption) and authentication on the Internet. CA’s
signed certificates presented by web services, which
clients verify to be valid. CAs can sometimes revoke
certificates when they are compromised and one way to
do that is to provide an OCSP service, which clients can
query to check the validity of a certificate presented by
a website. In a recent ROS attack in 2016, users were
unable to connect securely to websites which used Glob-
alSign as their CA, since their OCSP servers mistakenly
marked valid certificates for numerous websites as in-
valid due to a misconfiguration [6].
Reduction of Quality (RoQ) Reduction of Quality
happens when a WS falls victim to performance degrada-
tion, resulting in increased page load times for its users
as a consequence of different types of throttling or ad-
mission control mechanisms [22]. This is not good for
a number of reasons, 1) Users eventually stop using the
service when they experience poor performance, 2) This
results in loss of revenue for the WSes. There can be
many ways to do a Reduction of Quality attack. For
instance, Stark et al.,[33] describes the additional delay
that occurs in the TLS handshake when a user validates
the status of a certificate by contacting the OCSP server.
They show that OCSP validation can cause a mean de-
lay of approximately 500ms. So if these OCSP requests
go into timeout, due to high load or unavailability of the
OCSP server, it can cause huge performance penalty for
the users. Moreover, a certain form of denial of service
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attacks can also cause huge performance degradations
[22] which involves sending a sustained traffic workload
that keeps the WS flooded with traffic, without causing
DoS but performance degradation to its users. Such kind
of attacks, can also exploit the various TPS dependencies
that exist in the Internet infrastructure.
Motivating Questions These case studies and inci-
dents spark several natural questions about the state of
the web services ecosystem today:
• How pervasive are such dependencies between pop-
ular WSes and various TPSes (e.g., DNS, CDN)
providers?
• How many of these dependencies are direct and how
many of them are hidden or indirect transitive depen-
dencies?
• How robust or fragile is a typical WS today with re-
spect to different types of TPSes?
• Are there other service providers (such as Dyn) that
are key points of vulnerability on the Internet, such
that an attack on them could lead to significant collat-
eral damage to multiple webservices?
Our goal is to shed light on these questions to better
understand the robustness/fragility of the web ecosystem
and to provide recommendations for improving their ro-
bustness going forward. In the next section, we describe
our measurement methodology to collect data about the
service dependencies on the Alexa’s [2] top 100,000
WSes and then present our analysis and implications.
3 Preliminaries and Methodology
In this section, we describe our measurement method-
ology to shed light on the motivating questions listed
above. We also define the types of dependencies we fo-
cus on in our analysis. We also highlight key limitations
of our analysis to help put our results in context.
3.1 Problem Scope and Definitions
To understand the types of services we need to analyze,
it is instructive to start by looking at the life cycle of a
typical web request as illustrated in Figure 1. When a
user makes request to a Web service (WS) such as exam-
ple.com, the request first goes through a name resolution
phase, where the hostname to IP translation is fetched
from the authoritative nameserver of example.com. Af-
ter having the successful resolution, the request then goes
through a routing phase to reach example.com server. If
the website is using HTTPS, the request goes through a
certificate exchange phase. The client then consults the
respective OCSP server to validate the certificate. Af-
ter this, user requests the homepage of example.com and
the content of example.com might be hosted by a CDN,
and loading the page may entail contacting one or more
TPSes as well.
Figure 1: The figure shows the complete life cycle of
a web request and the different services it interacts
with.
We refer to the origin service (e.g., example.com) as
a WSes and non-origin hosted services as TPSes (which
can be either infrastructure services such as CDN, DNS,
or CA or other WSes).
We can model the observed relationships between
the various services as a dependency graph: G =
(S,D), where S is the set of services and D is the
set of directed edges depicting a dependency between
services. Each node in the graph is represented
as a tuple: s = 〈name,service type〉, where ser-
vice type can be a website, CDN, DNS or OCSP.
Edges represent s dependencies, denoted as: d =
〈source,target,dependency type〉.
In our analysis, we consider two types of dependen-
cies:
1. Direct Dependency: We say that a service s1 has a
direct dependency on service s2 if s1 uses s2, It is
denoted as 〈s1,s2,direct〉.
From a robustness point of view, we are also specif-
ically interested in the notion of exclusive depen-
dency. That is, if service s1 has a direct dependency
on service s2 where s2 is of type A and there exists
no service s3 of the same type A such that s1 has di-
rect dependency on s3. For example, Figure 2 shows
that (example.com,website) is directly dependent on
both (DNS 1,DNS) and (DNS 2,DNS) for service
type DNS. However, it is exclusively dependent on
CDN A for service type CDN.
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Figure 2: The figure shows that example.com has a di-
rect dependency on DNS 1 and DNS 2 and exclusive
dependency on CDN A.
2. Indirect or Transitive Dependency:1
If a service s1 has an exclusive dependency on ser-
vice s2 and s2 has an exclusively dependency on ser-
vice s3, then we say that s1 has a transitive depen-
dency on service s3.
Figure 3 shows an example of transitive dependen-
cies. If DNS 1 fails, this results in the failure of
OCSP1 and all the websites exclusively dependent
on it are affected as well.
Figure 3: An example of a transitive dependency
3.2 Measurement Methodology
To assess the hidden dependencies among WSes and
third party infrastructure providers, we measure the au-
thoritative nameservers (NS), CDNs (if any) and Certifi-
cate revocation information (OCSP servers and CRL dis-
tribution points) for Alexa’s top 100,000 WSes. Alexa
rank is calculated based on the traffic data which includes
unique visitors and page views of a particular WS [7].
The traffic across ranks drops roughly exponentially as
shown by [1][11]. Therefore, we assume, top 100,000
1We use the terms indirect and transitive interchangeably to refer to
this type of dependency throughout the paper.
WSes cover a significant amount of traffic on the Inter-
net. Since Alexa’s rankings change over time, we used a
consistent list for all our measurements.
In order to find out the authoritative name servers, we use
dig (Domain Information Groper) which is a command
line tool to query DNS servers [3]. We issue normal dig
queries for the NS (nameserver) records which give the
records for authoritative nameservers of these domains.
We use Google’s global DNS server [8] to query this in-
formation. In order to distinguish between private and
TPS DNS providers, we used several indicators such as
available lists of Third party DNS providers [12], the
number of WSes using a particular DNS provider. How-
ever, there is no accurate way to detect if a WS is using
a third party DNS provider. We observed 21419 DNS
providers in total, 92% of these serve less than 5 WSes
in the top 100,000. We do not say anything about these
DNS providers and since our analysis concerns the ones
that predominantly serve WSes, we looked at all those
DNS providers which serve more than 100 WSes. This
list included total of 82 DNS providers, which we man-
ually checked to see how many of these provide DNS
services and found that 79 of them are Third party DNS
providers. These 79 DNS providers cover 58% of the to-
tal WSes. Therefore, for our analysis, we only consider
these 79 DNS providers to be TPSes. So our analysis
might be an under-estimation.
Similarly the information related to OCSP servers and
CRL distribution points can be extracted from the certifi-
cate of the respective WS. To fetch certificates, we first
send a SYN on TCP port 43 to see if the WS supports
HTTPS. If we receive a Connection Refused error, then
it means the WS does not support HTTPS. Next we ini-
tiate an HTTPS connection with it and fetch the certifi-
cates. We observed 69 distinct OCSP server and manu-
ally checked that 57 of them were TPS. We detected this
by looking up how many of these provide CA services to
other WSes.
CDN information of a website can be extracted from
its canonical (CNAME) records. When a WS uses a
CDN, the CNAME that it uses points towards the CDNs.
Moreover, some CDNs set custom HTTP headers in the
web request. To find the CDNs used by a website, we
performed dig CNAME (canonical name) queries on all
the links that belong to the same host, in a domain web-
page. By looking at these records, we extract the CDNs
using some indicators in the CNAME. We also look at
HTTP headers to see for any custom headers set by the
CDNs. A complete list of these indicators is mentioned
here [36]. However, we are not able to detect any CDNs
that are not mentioned in this list. We observed 47 dis-
tinct CDNs and found that 44 of them are TPS.
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DNS Total Unique DNS Providers 21419
CDN Total WSes that use CDN 29273Total unique CDNs ob-
served
47
OCSP Total WSes that supportHTTPS
49170
Total unique OCSPs ob-
served
69
Table 1: Summary of the dataset collected for analy-
sis
3.3 Limitations
We acknowledge some key limitations of the dataset and
measurements to help put our results in perspective:
• First, we only study the interaction of a client with
DNS, CA, CDN and other third-party providers for a
particular WS that are externally visible. For instance,
we will miss dependencies if the interactions are via
APIs between the services that are out-of-band; e.g.,
an ad exchange being contacted while the ad-service
is being loaded.
• Second, all of our measurements are conducted from
a single vantage point in the US East coast. While
we believe this is representative view of the struc-
tural dependencies of typical and popular WSes, we
might miss region-specific dependencies; e.g., if the
content rendered say in Asia-Pacific has a different
dependency structure.
• Third, we do not measure the dependencies or robust-
ness with respect to the physical and network infras-
tructure; e.g., with respect to the physical hosting,
or network routing, or physical capacity limitations.
Thus, when we present our results as a service being
potentially vulnerable it is a capacity- and hosting-
agnostic analysis. Such data is proprietary and hard
to obtain in practice; we believe that our analysis has
value even with this limitation. In particular, as prior
attacks have shown it is not unreasonable that the ad-
versary can suitably map the infrastructure and scale
their capacity as needed [32, 24].
• Fourth, we do not consider dependencies that might
arise from software vulnerabilities; e.g., if the ser-
vices are running vulnerable versions of web/database
servers or content management systems.
• Fifth, we do not focus on dependencies between web-
services themselves; e.g., if some third-party widget
or scripts are loaded. While this too can have im-
plications for security (e.g., privacy), our focus in
this paper is largely on the infrastructure components
like DNS, CDN, and CAs. We refer the readers to
other related work for analysis of third-party web con-
tent [31, 15].
• Finally, we only analyze the dependencies as ob-
served on the landing pages of the popular websites.
While we believe this is representative of common
workload patterns, we do acknowledge that we do not
measure dependencies that may manifest deeper in the
content hierarchy.
4 Analyzing Direct Dependencies
In this section, we consider the direct dependencies that
WSes have on various TPSes. We analyze how robust
individual WSes are in using TPSes and also find that a
small number of TPSes are critical for a large fraction of
WSes.
4.1 Robustness of WSes
Observation 1: Third-party services and content are
widely used –76.7% WSes use one or more TPS in-
frastructure providers and 90.7% of WS entail loading
third-party content from other WSes
Table 2 shows that out of the top-100K sites, more
than 90 % use at least one TPS for their operation. Sev-
eral studies have shown that modern webservices load
content from multiple third-parties [31, 15]. Most of
these prior studies have focused on the privacy leakage
implications of third-party content and on potential per-
formance bottlenecks in the web browser [16]. Our focus
here is on the robustness and dependencies on third-party
services.
We further break these dependencies into common in-
frastructure services (e.g., DNS, CDN, and OCSP) vs.
third-party WSes (e.g., for ads or analytics or other wid-
gets). We find that almost 77% of sites use at least one
third-party infrastructure service provider (i.e., CDN,
DNS, or OCSP). This confirms that third-party service
providers are indeed a fact-of-life for modern webser-
vices.
TPSes Percentage of
WSes
Ad services 62.1
Analytics 55
Overall Third-party
resources
90.7
Third-party infras-
tructure
76.7
Table 2: Prevalence of TPSes in the top 100k WSes
Next, we look in greater depth at the specific infras-
tructure services such as DNS, CDN, and OCSP as they
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can have key security implications for the correctness
and availability of a given WS.
Observation 2: Out of top 100k WSes, 58% use TPS
DNS. 96.6% of these WSes are fragile as they have an
exclusive dependency on a Third party DNS provider.
This constitutes 55.6% of the top 100k WSes.
We begin by analyzing the robustness of WSes in their
use of TPS for DNS. For instance, Twitter and Spotify
both relied on Dyn for hosting authoritative name ser-
vices.
For DNS, robustness means that a WS should not have
exclusive dependency on any single DNS provider be-
cause in case of an attack or any other kind of failure,
these will be affected as compared to the ones who use
multiple providers.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of WSes that have an ex-
clusive dependency on a single TPS DNS provider. We
observed that out of the top 100K sites, 58% WSes used
third party DNS providers. 96.6% of them are not robust
and have an exclusive dependency on one TPS DNS. We
also observe that this percentage fragility of WSes varies
across the different popularity rank ranges. WSes that
are more popular are marginally more likely to be robust
compared to the ones that are less popular. For instance,
in the top 100, 33 WSes in total use third party DNS and
50% of them are fragile.
This observation shows that most WSes today do not
use TPSes in a robust manner. We also looked at the Dyn
incident to analyze the reaction of WSes to the whole in-
cident. Table 3 shows the number of WSes that used Dyn
before and after the impact. It can be seen that the preva-
lent behavior among WSes was to not change anything.
However, we see some cases where WSes became robust
by having a secondary DNS provider. We also found that
the WSes that left, 73% of these went to other TPSes
and only 5 of these left Dyn and joined two other TPSes
DNS providers. A total of 5 WSes that left shifted to
having their own private DNS among the top 10k WSes.
We revisit this in Section 6 when we elaborate on recom-
mendations for different stakeholders.
Observation 3: Out of the 49.2% WSes which support
HTTPS, 96% use TPS OCSPs and roughly 20% use
OCSP stapling to lessen this dependency.
An important component of the HTTPS workflow is
the use of OCSP or CRL servers to check the validity
of the certificate. As observed elsewhere [33, 10], this
step can add non-trivial latency to the TLS handshakes
and there are several ongoing efforts to speed this proto-
col [33].
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Figure 4: The percentage of WSes that use a TPS
DNS provider and are fragile since they exclusively
depend on one DNS provider. We plot data for differ-
ent WSes rank ranges (top 100, top 100,000). More
popular WSes (51.5% top 100), are more robust than
the less popular ones (96.60%, top 100K).
100 1000 10,000
Total No. of WSes
before
19 103 483
No. of robust WSes
before
11 41 151
No. of WSes affected 8 62 332
WSes that left 3 10 50
WSes that left and
shifted to private
0 1 4
WSes that became
robust
3 21 74
WSes that did noth-
ing
2 31 208
Table 3: The table shows how WSes reacted to the
Dyn incident in the top 100, 1000 and 10,000 WSes
Out of the set of top 100k WSes we analyzed, roughly
half (49.2%) support HTTPS. These numbers are con-
sistent with recent reports on the increased adoption of
HTTPS. Of this set of WSes that are HTTPS-enabled,
almost all of them (96%) rely on TPSes for OCSP.
Now, one well-known approach for a WS to be robust
and remove this third party dependency is to use OCSP
Stapling [9]. OCSP Stapling effectively allows the WS
to bear the resource cost involved in providing OCSP re-
sponses by appending a time-stamped OCSP response
signed by the CA to the initial TLS handshake, thus elim-
inating the need for clients to contact the CA.
However, unlike OCSP and CRLs which involve the
CA, to support OCSP WS administrators have to enable
it. Unfortunately, as we see in Figure 5, only a small
fraction of the WSes use OCSP Stapling and are thus
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Figure 5: The percentage of WSes that support OCSP
Stapling. We plot data for different WSes rank
ranges (top 100, top 100,000). Support for OCSP Sta-
pling varies across ranks with more popular WSes
(38.18%, top 100) showing higher %age of OCSP
Stapling support as compared to less popular ones
(20.67%, top 100K)
exposed to potential RoQ and RoS attacks.
Observation 4: 30% of WSes use CDNs, 96.7% of
these use TPS CDNs, and 93% of these, have an
exclusive dependency on one CDN provider.
Robustness in case of a CDN is similar to that of a
DNS provider. A WS should ideally not have an exclu-
sive dependency on one particular CDN. While one CDN
might offer 100% uptime, choosing more than one CDN
means having a fallback in case of an outage because
traffic will get rerouted to the other CDN.
We analyzed the top 100,000 WSes, and observe that
roughly 30% of these use some form of CDN, either pri-
vate (E.g., large providers like Google or Netflix often
run their own CDN infrastructure) or TPS CDN services.
The vast majority of WSes (96.7%) that use CDNs rely
on TPSes, which is unsurprising given the massive in-
frastructure and management costs associated with op-
erating CDNs. Of these, we find that 93% of them are
not robust as shown in figure 6. Similar to DNS, this de-
gree of robustness varies across ranks with more popular
WSes being more robust.
Implications We observe that when we combine the
sets of WSes that are exclusively dependent on either
TPS CDN, OCSP or DNS provider, we get 73.14% of
WSes that have a single point of failure. The above ob-
servations on the exclusive dependencies on TPSes has
key implications for the RoQ, RoS, and DoS attacks we
considered in Section 2. For instance, the fragility in
WS→ DNS dependency has key implications for DoS
and RoQ for the users as we have seen with the Dyn in-
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Figure 6: The percentage of WSes that use a TPS
CDN provider and are fragile since they exclusively
depend on one CDN provider. We plot data for differ-
ent WSes rank ranges (top 100, top 100,000). More
popular WSes (74.28% top 100), are comparatively
more robust than the less popular ones (93.10%, top
100K).
cident, and 55.6% of WSes are vulnerable to this. The
non-robust use of CAs,WS→OCSP leads to threats like
RoS and RoQ as observed in prior work [33] and 85.2%
of WSes that support HTTPS are vulnerable to these kind
of attacks. Finally, the exclusive dependency on a sin-
gle third party CDN WS→ CDNs can leads to threats
like DoS and RoQ and 93.3% of WSes that use CDNs
are vulnerable to this. In general, we find that a major-
ity (73.14%) of the top 100k WSes are prone to attacks.
In such a scenario, a common dependency among these
fragile WSes can cause huge damage.
4.2 Concentration in Third-party services
The previous analysis shows that a large fraction of WSes
are not robust in their use of TPSes. Now, what it does
not show is whether a large fraction of these WSes rely
on the same subset of TPSes or if there is a substantial
diversity in this pattern. In this section, we focus on the
concentration behavior where a small number of TPSes
predominantly offer these services. This type of con-
centration and the clustering does not bode well as these
TPSes become good targets for attack that can effectively
impact a large number of WSes (e.g., Dyn attack took
down a large number of popular services).
Observation 5: Top 10 TPS DNS providers cover
37.8% of the top 100k WSes.
Figure 8 shows the fraction of WSes covered by the
top-K DNS for different WS popularity ranges. For clar-
ity of presentation, the figure only considers the coverage
by analyzing the exclusive dependences of WSes on a
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Figure 7: The figure shows dependency graph of top
100k WSes and their DNS providers. The size of DNS
provider node is proportional to the number of web-
sites using them. It can be seen that Cloudflare is the
major provider for the top 100k WSes
particular provider. (The WSes that have more than one
DNS providers are marked as “multiple” in the figure.)
In total, we observed 21,419 DNS providers in total for
our set of WSes. We do see a long-tailed behavior, where
19,650 served less than 5 WSes. However, among the re-
maining 1769 providers, we see that a small number of
providers cover almost 50% of the WSes as seen in Fig-
ure 8.
Among these TPS DNS providers, we see that Cloud-
flare is the major provider and covers almost 17% of the
total 100k WSes. However, within the top 100 websites,
AWS DNS which is Amazon route 53 DNS service and
Dyn are the dominant ones. Furthermore, the contribu-
tion of AWS DNS is almost the same across all ranks of
WSes. This ranking might be important because more
popular WSes carry more traffic and hence can do more
damage.
Observation 6: Top 10 TPS CA cover 94.3% of the
WSes that support HTTPS. This constitutes 46% of the
top 100k WSes.
Figure 10 shows the percentage distribution of CAs that
host OCSP servers for top k websites. In our measure-
ments, we found that the WS→ CA dependency is al-
ways exclusive. In total, we observed 69 unique OCSP
servers for our set of WSes. However, from the figure we
can see that out of these, just 7 services cover more than
90% of the WSes across each rank range. Among these 7
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Figure 8: The figure shows percentage contribution
of top 10 DNS providers for different rank ranges
(100,100k). The graph only includes exclusive depen-
dency on a particular provider. Websites that use
multiple providers are shown as“Multiple”. It can be
seen that top 10 DNS providers constitute almost 38%
of the total WSes
Figure 9: The figure shows dependency graph of top
100,000 websites and their OCSP providers. The size
of OCSP provider node is proportional to the number
of websites using them.It can be seen that Comodo is
the major CA among all 100k WSes.
services, Symantec, GeoTrust, Digicert are the dominant
providers across all rank ranges. Interestingly, Comodo
which is the most popular service in the overall set, only
serves a small number of WSes in top 100. This behavior
is similar to Cloudflare in DNS providers. Investigating
this further, we found that most of these ( 88% ) of these
WSes actually use Cloudflare as their DNS and CDN,
8
which suggests a hidden correlation as well.
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Figure 10: The figure shows percentage contribution
of top 10 CAs that host OCSP servers for WSes in
various rank ranges (100,100k). It can be seen that
top 10 major providers cover almost 95% of the total
HTTPS-enabled WSes
Observation 7: Top 10 TPS CDN providers cover
86.4% of the WSes that use CDNs. This constitutes
25.3% of the top 100k WSes.
Figure 11: The figure shows dependency graph of
top 100,000 websites and CDN providers. The size
of CDN node is proportional to the number of web-
sites using them. It can be seen that Cloudflare and
Akamai are among the two major providers.
We observed 47 TPS CDNs in total for the top 100,000
WSes. If we look at figure 12, it is quite evident that
there are a few major providers like Cloudflare, Akamai,
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Figure 12: The figure shows percentage contribution
of top 10 TPS CDNS for WSes in various rank ranges
(100,100k). It can be seen that top 10 major providers
cover almost 86% of the total WSes that use CDNs
Amazon Cloudfront, that are dominant across all ranks.
Cloudflare, here too, is not dominant in top 100 WSes.
Figure 11 gives a view of these clusters and the existence
of a few major providers.
Implications At first glance, the web ecosystem may
appear decentralized with a low barrier of entry. How-
ever, the reality is that a handful of TPS providers serve
most of the popular WSes. As we observed, in case DNS,
top 10 providers cover 37.8% of the top 100k WSes.
Similarly top 10 CDN providers cover 25.3% of them
while top 10 OCSP servers cover 46% of the total 100k
WSes. This situation is a bit alarming, considering al-
most 50% of the top 100k WSes being managed by just
10 providers. Consequently, if these providers are under
attack or there is some kind of misconfiguration at their
end, then a huge part of the web ecosystem will likely be
unavailable or function incorrectly. In fact, these are the
high profile targets that attackers (e.g., the Mirai botnet)
may consider (and likely already do) as potential targets
for future attack campaigns.The top 10 CDNs and DNS
might be very food targets for RoQ and DoS attacks.
Similarly, top 10 OCSP providers, will be a very good
target for RoS and RoQ attacks, particularly if the aim of
the attacker is to maximize the total damage caused.
5 Analyzing Transitive Dependencies
During the Dyn incident, many WSes went down. For
many of these, the downtime was directly attributed to
Dyn; i.e., the ones that had a direct dependency on Dyn.
A perhaps less prominent observation was that a few key
CDNs, such as Fastly, also were unreachable and con-
sequently any WS that used Fastly was therefore also
down. The reason for this was that Fastly was using Dyn,
and thus there was an indirect dependency of WSes that
9
used Fastly, on Dyn [5].
Motivated by this observation, we now systematically
study the extent of these indirect, potentially “hidden”,
and transitive dependencies. To do so, we again fo-
cus on the three key TPSes: DNS, CDN, and OCSP,
and determine how many of the popular services from
each of these categories are dependent on each other (e.g.
OCSP→DNS, OCSP→CDN, etc). We then do a what-
if analysis on the potential impact of these indirect de-
pendencies and which TPSes are most critical in case
of an attack. We also study how the landscape changes
when we consider both indirect and direct dependencies,
as compared to direct dependencies alone.
We consider three different kinds of intra-TPS depen-
dencies: OCSP → CDN, OCSP → DNS and CDN →
DNS.2 To get this data, we use the same approach that
we used for WSes. To find the DNS used by CDNs, we
look at the custom CNAMEs set by each CDN for var-
ious WSes and from that we extract the CDN domain
to perform dig queries on it. Similarly to find the DNS
of OCSP servers, we extract the OCSP URL from the
certificate and perform dig queries on the host. Further-
more, for finding CDNs used by OCSP servers, we check
CNAME for the hosts extracted from the OCSP URL and
use the same approach as mentioned in Section 3. We
now consider each of them separately. Note that as be-
fore, for each of the indirect dependencies, we mark the
TPS that another TPS depends on as not robust if it is an
exclusive dependency.
5.1 Robustness of TPSes
Dependency Total TPS De-
pendencies
Fragile
CDN→ DNS 19 16
OCSP→ DNS 34 29
OCSP→CDN 18 18
Table 4: The table shows for each dependency, the
number of provider dependent on TPS provider and
the number of fragile provider among them.
Observation 8: 40.4% of CDNs and 49% of OCSP
services use a TPS DNS provider. 85% of these CDNs
and OCSP services are not robust. Similarly, 33.3% of
OCSP providers use a TPS CDN, and 100% of these
OCSP services are not robust.
Table 4 provides a summary of our results analyzing
these intra-TPS dependencies discussed above.
2The other dependencies do not make sense in practice and natu-
rally do not manifest in the real world.
CDN→ DNS dependency: CDNs typically have their
own DNS infrastructure so that they have more control
over where customer traffic gets routed to. However, we
found that this was not quite the case. Out of a total
47 observed CDN providers, 19 (40.4%) actually use a
TPS, of which 16 (84.2%) are exclusively dependent on
a single DNS provider. The two top DNS providers for
CDNs are AWS-DNS and Dyn, with AWS DNS serving
9 CDNs. (These CDNs do not provide services to a sig-
nificant amount of WSes and are not among the major
providers.)
OCSP → DNS dependency: Out of 69 OCSP
providers, 34 of them (49%) use TPS DNS providers, of
which 29 (85.2%) were exclusively dependent on a sin-
gle provider, and thus are not robust. Interestingly, five of
these OCSP providers that are not robust rank within the
top-10 most used OCSP service providers and are used
by 34% of the WSes that support HTTPS.
OCSP→ CDN dependency: We observed that many
CAs host OCSP servers on CDNs for performance gain.
Out of the 69 OCSP providers, 18 of them (26.1%) use
TPS CDN providers, of which all 18 were exclusive de-
pendencies (100%). 5 of these are among the top 10
OCSP providers and cover 35.3% of the total WSes that
support HTTPS.
Implications This is a surprising result that many of
these TPSes are themselves interdependent and more-
over have non-robust dependencies. This suggests that
WSes who rely on these non-robust TPSes may need to
take additional safeguards; e.g., either adding a layer of
redundancy themselves or switching to other more robust
TPSes.
5.2 Impact of transitive dependencies
We looked into the transitive dependencies induced
by intra-dependency of TPSes. Specifically, we con-
sider four-types of transitive dependencies: (1) WSes→
OCSP→DNS; (2)WSes→OCSP→CDN; (3)WSes→
CDN→DNS; and (4) OCSP→CDN→DNS. Next, we
characterize the impact of such transitive dependencies
on the popular WSes.
Observation 9: With indirect dependencies, 37.2%
of the top 100,000 WSes are now dependent on just
the top-10 CDN providers. Similarly, due to indirect
dependencies 56.4% of the top 100,000 WSes are now
dependent on the top-10 DNS providers.
Based on these transitive dependencies, next we charac-
terize how the top 100,000 WSes were affected in terms
of their robustness. Due to indirect dependencies, 37.6%
of the top 100,000 WSes are now dependent on the top-
10 CDN providers. In contrast, when considering direct
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dependencies only, all CDN providers collectively cov-
ered only 30% of the top 100,000 WSes. Note that now,
in addition to the direct dependency, a WS can be depen-
dent on a particular CDN provider, via an OCSP.
Similarly, due to indirect dependencies 56.4% of the
top 100,000 WSes are now dependent on the top-10 DNS
providers. In comparison, 58% of the top 100,000 web-
sites were directly dependent on all third party DNS
providers. In other words, with transitive dependencies
a significant portion of the most popular websites be-
come dependent on relatively few DNS and CDN ser-
vice providers, increasing the concentration effects we
saw earlier in Section 4.
Figure 13: The figure shows the overall dependency
graph of top 100,000 WSes on various TPSes. The size
of each node is proportional to their collateral dam-
age. The weight of each edge is proportional to the
collateral damage of the source node. The graph also
shows intra-TPS dependencies. It can be seen that
Akamai DNS, Comodo CA etc are among the major
TPS providers.
Observation 10: Transitive dependencies can amplify
the total damage caused by a TPS provider and the
structure of the top 10 highest impact TPS DNS and
CDNs changes when we consider transitive dependen-
cies.
Figure 13 represents a weighted graph showing the
transitive relation among various TPSes and WSes,
where the edge weights are proportional to the in-degree
of the source node (thicker lines means higher weight).
The size of each node in the graph is proportional to the
number of WSes dependent on them. We next consider
each service DNS, CDN and CA and show that transi-
tive dependencies amplify the collateral damage caused
by each provider.
Figure 14 shows the top 10 DNS providers after con-
sidering indirect dependencies. It also shows their re-
spective impact with only direct dependencies. The x-
axis shows the total number of WSes affected. There are
two interesting observations from the figure. First, some
DNS providers almost have little to no direct effect on
their failure but have significant transitive impact; e.g.,
Verisign DNS and Fastly DNS. These providers would
not even show up in the most popular DNS providers
if only direct dependencies with WSes were considered.
Second, for almost all of these top DNS providers, the
transitive impact on them being unavailable affects sig-
nificantly more WSes than those that directly depend on
them. For example, Cloudflare would adversely affect
20.32% WSes when including indirect impact, as com-
pared to 16% WS directly. Similarly, Akamai directly
affects 1.3% of WSes. However, with indirect depen-
dency, it can affect 18% of the total WSes which is more
than 10X amplification.
Figure 15 similarly compares the number of WSes af-
fected for the top 10 CDN providers, with and with-
out considering transitive dependencies. Similar to the
case for third party DNS providers, if some providers
(e.g. Akamai and Cloudflare) went down they would ad-
versely affect significantly more WSes indirectly. Aka-
mai being unavailable would affect 15% of WSes when
including indirect impact, as compared to 4.5%
Implications We conjecture that some of these
providers that are not in the top-k for direct dependen-
cies but appear in the top-k coverage via indirect depen-
dencies are likely less provisioned. This has key impli-
cations from an attack perspective as the attackers in the
future may be able to have the same volume of impact
with significantly fewer resources. This also points to
a natural direction for future work—we need to explore
the capacity and hosting footprint of these services in
greater depth. Also, this information is useful if an at-
tacker wants to amplify a particular kind of attack, for
example, consider if the attacker’s goal is to do an RoS
attack while maximizing damage, then the attacker could
attack an indirect link on which many OCSPs depend etc.
Observation 11: Targeting low-ranked WSes can cause
a collateral damage of upto 20% to the top 100k WSes
Finally, we consider a form of collateral damage that
could result due to indirect dependencies. Specifically,
we consider the collateral damage can be defined as the
number of WSes affected as a result of targeting one par-
ticular WS. That is, imagine a WS W being subject to a
11
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Cloudflare
Akamai
AWS DNS
Verisign DNS
Go Daddy
Dns Pod
Fastly DNS
Dynect
DNS Made Easy
HiChina
Number of WSes Affected
DN
S 
Pr
ov
ide
rs
Direct + Transitive Direct
Figure 14: The figure shows top 10 TPS DNSs and the
number of WSes that get affected as a result of direct,
direct+transitive dependencies on these providers.
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Figure 15: The figure shows top 10 TPS CDNs and the
number of WSes that get affected as a result of direct,
direct+transitive dependencies on these providers.
DoS attack. Now, suppose this attack impacts the perfor-
mance and availability of the TPS T that W uses. The
impact on T in turn can cause other WSes W’ to also be
indirectly impacted because of this attack. We acknowl-
edge that this type of analysis is speculative and there
are many caveats here as we assume that T does not have
perfect resource isolation across its various customers.
We argue that this is in fact quite plausible as not all re-
sources (E.g., network bandwidth inside a datacenter or
WAN connectivity from an exchange point) may be mul-
tiplexed and there may less-than-perfect isolation. Thus,
from a defensive perspective this is a potential attack we
need to consider in the future.
For this analysis, we consider the six different attack
vectors to attack a WS: three of these arise as a result of
direct dependency of WSes on CDNs, DNS and OCSP
servers. The other three arise as a result of dependencies
among TPSes, and hence, a WS can attacked from an
indirect link as well.
Note that since there are a few major TPSes, the col-
lateral damage of all WSes dependent on a particular
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Figure 16: Distribution of WSes across ranks for the
five maximum %age collateral damage observed. In
the rank range from 90-100k WSes, there exist about
1500 WSes that can cause a %age collateral damage
of 20%
provider will be same. We calculate the collateral dam-
age associated with all the top 100k WSes, across all the
six attack vectors and find the maximum collateral dam-
age associated with each WS. Then we rank these WSes
based on their collateral damage. We observed that max-
imum collateral damage associated with a WS to be 20%
of the top 100k WSes. In order to understand, the rank
distribution among these WSes, that cause a given collat-
eral damage, we divide top 100k WSes into 10 groups of
range 10,000 WSes as shown in figure 16 and see for a
given collateral damage, let’s say 20%, how many WSes
fall in a particular range group. It can be seen from the
graph that roughly 1500 WSes in the rank range of 90k-
100k can cause a collateral damage of 20% to the top
100k WSes. The graph shows this trend for the five max-
imum %age collateral damage observed.
Implications This is important from the WS point of
view. Some popular WSes may not want to be co-
dependent on a TPS provider, with some low-ranked or
highly susceptible to be targeted WSes for instance, in
the past there have been attacks on gambling sites [13].
This information can help WSes in making business de-
cisions with robustness in mind.
6 Discussion and Recommendations
Based on our observations and analysis, we discuss key
recommendations for different stakeholders.
Web services: The first and obvious recommendation
for WSes is that they need to build in more resilience
and redundancy when using TPSes. In fact, we already
see this happening to some effect as a result of the Dyn
incident (see Table 3). A second, and perhaps more sub-
12
tle recommendation is that WSes may need to analyze
the hidden dependencies of the TPSes they use as they
maybe indirectly exposed to potential threats. For in-
stance, the types of analysis we have performed can be
made available as a neutral service that WSes can query
before making business decisions.
Third party services: TPSes (e.g., like Dyn) should
be more transparent about the types of attacks they see
and also about the potential redundancies they have in
place to tackle large-scale attacks. Furthermore, TPSes
should also be judicious in how they rely on other TPSes
since the transitive dependencies can significantly impact
a large fraction of WSes.
Attackers: On the negative side, our findings also have
key implications for future attack strategies. The sim-
plest observation is that the attackers can use these results
and measurement techniques as a form of reconnaissance
to inform their future targets to maximize their return-
on-investments. For instance, the attackers may induce a
larger impact by attacking less-provisioned TPSes rather
than directly attacking well-provisioned WSes. Further-
more, attackers may launch indirect attacks by targeting
seemingly unrelated TPSes to create indirect DoS and
RoQ attacks for targets of interest. Such indirect attacks
may be hard to debug and diagnose and for WSes to de-
fend against since they may not have any direct contrac-
tual relationships with the impacted TPSes.
7 Related Work
Our study is related to a rich literature of measurements
of the web ecosystem and the Internet infrastructure.
However, there is surprisingly little or no systematic
analysis of the fragility of the web ecosystem with re-
spect to the TPSes and types of direct and indirect de-
pendencies we report here.
Website complexity and performance: There are sev-
eral prior works that have analyzed the widespread use
of third-party content in popular websites. Butkiewicz
et al., study the impact of the complexity of the web-
site as measured in terms of the number of objects and
number of third-party objects on the website load time
(e.g., [15]). Other work systematically analyzes the crit-
ical paths to understand if and how specific content im-
pacts the page load time (e.g., [35]). These are related
to a potential RoQ attack; however, our focus is on the
infrastructure services at a higher level than individual
websites. Other work focuses on the privacy implica-
tions of the tracking services that appear on the website
(e.g., [31, 27, 25]). The focus on privacy implications is
orthogonal to our work.
Dependency measurement in distributed sys-
tems: There are a number of other efforts to understand
the dependencies in distributed systems in order to help
with performance debugging and diagnosis (e.g., [28]).
This type of related work is complementary to our work
since they focus on the intra-hosting and internal depen-
dencies rather than the external facing dependencies on
third-party services.
Understanding CDN and hosting: Given the large
footprint and popular use of CDNs and hosting services,
there have been a number of measurement studies to un-
derstand CDNs as early as 2001 [26]. For instance, re-
cent work analyzes the hosting infrastructure of popular
websites [14]. Other work maps the growing infrastruc-
ture and edge deployment by popular content providers
(e.g., [17]). Such analysis can complement our analy-
sis especially as we do not consider the hosting infras-
tructure and capacity bottlenecks of these popular ser-
vices. This is a natural direction for future work to extend
our analysis. Other recent work points out an increasing
adoption of DDoS protection services by WSes [23].
Internet-wide measurement: In addition to web mea-
surement, there is also a broader interest in understand-
ing Internet infrastructure. For instance, Zmap [20] and
Censys [19] present mechanisms to scan the Internet to
understand the open and vulnerable services. Our focus
on web infrastructure is complementary to this work.
TLS and certificate measurements: Other work has
analyzed the use of TLS, the certificate ecosystem, and
the use of Certificate Revocation in the wild (e.g., [18,
34, 29]). These suggest potential RoS attacks that could
be executed via the TPSes we analyze here.
8 Conclusions
This paper was motivated by the recent Dyn incident that
led to several popular web services being offline as a re-
sult of a DoS attack on the DNS provider. This motivated
us to look at the broader landscape of the robustness
of modern web services, the dependencies they have on
third-party services, as well as more hidden and transitive
dependencies via these third-party services. Our analysis
paints a somewhat bleak situation on the state of modern
web ecosystem: (1) most webservices have little to no re-
dundancy when using third-party infrastructure services
(e.g., CDN, DNS, CAs); (2) a small number of thirdparty
services could become the Achilles’ heel for the web
ecosystem; and (3) considering transitive dependencies
can further exacerbate the attack surface and also sug-
gest more opportunities to affect the quality, availability,
and security of popular webservices. These observations
have key implications and can lead to concrete and ac-
tionable recommendation for different stakeholders (i.e.,
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attackers, web services, and third-party services). For
instances, web and third-party services should under-
stand their effective attack surface via direct and indirect
dependencies and build sufficient levels of redundancy,
while attackers can leverage these insights to optimally
choose targets for maximizing their future impact.
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